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This paper shows that although the top ten percent of colleges are substantially more selective now
than they were 5 decades ago, most colleges are not more selective.  Moreover, at least 50 percent
of colleges are substantially less selective now than they were then.  This paper demonstrates that competition
for space--the number of students who wish to attend college growing faster than the number of spaces
available--does not explain changing selectivity.  The explanation is, instead, that the elasticity of a
student's preference for a college with respect to its proximity to his home has fallen substantially
over time and there has been a corresponding increase in the elasticity of his preference for a college
with respect to its resources and peers.  In other words, students used to attend a local college regardless
of their abilities and its characteristics.  Now, their choices are driven far less by distance and far more
by a college's resources and student body. It is the consequent re-sorting of students among colleges
that has, at once, caused selectivity to rise in a small number of colleges while simultaneously causing
it to fall in other colleges.  I show that the integration of the market for college education has had profound
implications on the peers whom college students experience, the resources invested in their education,
the tuition they pay, and the subsidies they enjoy.  An important finding is that, even though tuition
has been rising rapidly at the most selective schools, the deal students get there has arguably improved
greatly.  The result is that the "stakes" associated with admission to these colleges are much higher
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If one spends time at certain colleges' events, one is likely to hear alumni 
exclaim that their college is so selective today that they would not be 
admitted were they to reapply.  Similarly, one might hear parents worry 
that their children are forced into excessive resume polishing because 
American colleges are increasingly selective.  These alumni and parents 
often assume that rising selectivity is a pervasive phenomenon, and they 
often also assume that it is caused by colleges' not having expanded 
sufficiently to accommodate the ever growing population of U.S. students 
with post-secondary ambitions.  The latter  assumption--that the supply of 
college places has been relatively inelastic despite a growing population of 
prospective students--would seem to explain rising tuition.  Thus, rising 
selectivity and rising tuition would seem to be part of the same logical 
phenomenon affecting higher education. 
  It turns out that the above thinking is a consequence of people 
extrapolating from the experience of a small number of colleges such as 
members of the Ivy League, Stanford, Duke, and so on. These colleges have 
experienced rising selectivity, but their experience turns out to be the 
exception rather than the rule.  Rising selectivity is by no means a 
pervasive phenomenon.  Only the top ten percent of colleges are 
substantially more selective now than they were in 1962.  Moreover, at least 
50 percent of colleges are substantially less selective now than they were in 
1962.  Typical college-going students in the U.S. should be unconcerned 
about rising selectivity.  If anything, they should be concerned about falling 
selectivity, the phenomenon they will actually experience. 
  Although some of the decreasing selectivity of most colleges is due to the 
number of places growing faster than the number of college-ready students, 
another explanation is also important.  This other explanation--moreover-- 
explains all of the increasing  selectivity of the top ten percent of colleges, 
where the number of places has grown at approximately the same rate as 
(just slightly faster than, in fact) the number of highly qualified students.  
What is this "other" explanation?  It is that the elasticity of a student's 
preference for a college with respect to its proximity to his home has fallen 
substantially over time and there has been a corresponding increase in the 
elasticity of his preference for a college with respect to its resources and 
peers.  Put more bluntly, students used to attend a local college regardless 
of their abilities and its characteristics.  Now, their choices are driven far 
less by distance and far more by a college's resources and student body. The  
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change in elasticities has been especially pronounced among students who 
are very well qualified for college.  It is the consequent re-sorting of 
students among colleges that has, at once, caused selectivity to rise in a 
small number of colleges while simultaneously causing it to fall in other 
colleges. 
  What has happened and what is happening to the market for college 
education is a species of globalization that has so far manifested itself 
mainly in the nationalization of local markets that were largely autarkic as 
recently as the end of World War II.  (Since the process continues and has 
not halted at U.S. borders, "globalization" and "integration" are more apt 
terms than "nationalization.")  The causes of integration, I will argue, are 
great decreases in the costs of information about students and colleges and 
substantial decreases in the costs of long-distance communication and 
transportation. Falling long-distance costs are routinely cited as causes of 
globalization, but the dramatically decreasing costs of information are 
somewhat unique to the market for college education. 
  The integration of the market for college education has had profound 
implications on which students attend which college and, thus, on 
selectivity.  I show this in the next section of the paper.  Integration has 
also had profound implications for colleges' resources, tuition, and subsidies 
for students.  These implications are somewhat more complex, and I trace 
them in the later sections of the paper, after reviewing a few models that 
help us understand what to expect.  For instance, I will show that, even 
though tuition has been rising rapidly at the most selective schools, the deal 
students get there has arguably improved greatly.  The result is that the 
"stakes" associated with admission to these colleges are much higher now 
than in the past. 
  This topic relates to many issues in the economics of higher education.  
In this article, I attempt to provide the key evidence and key economic logic.  
However, a reader who is curious to see some piece of the puzzle worked out 
in greater detail may wish to consult Hoxby, Competitive New World:  How 
American Colleges Learned to Compete and How They Will Change the 
World (forthcoming).  This work also contains additional details on the data 
and a formal version of some theory that I summarize here.1 
 
1  Construction of the dataset used for this paper was, in principle, 
straightforward but, in practice, required approximately 15 years of work.  
Thus, it is not surprising that previous commentators have often relied 
upon more anecdotal evidence.  The dataset includes virtually all 
quantitative information on colleges' students and finances that is available  
for the post World War II period.  Every existing college guide from 1940  
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The Changing Selectivity of American Colleges 
  Before considering why things changed or what the implications are, let 
us look simply at what happened to the selectivity of American colleges.  
The hard evidence starts with 1960s because that is when the the SAT® and 
ACT® (the  college entrance examinations that remain dominant today) 
came into widespread use.  However, available measures--like students' 
grades, class rank, and scores on less ubiquitous exams--suggest that the 
1960s were a continuation of dramatic changes that began in the 1950s. 
  In the figures that follow, colleges are grouped according to their 
selectivity in 1962.  The mean SAT score or ACT score of each college (math 
and verbal is translated into today's national percentiles of entrance exam 
takers.2  That is, we are looking at absolute exam performance on a stable 
metric.  Combined math and verbal (or comprehensive ACT) scores are 
used.  It is important to compute statistics over scores expressed in 
percentile points, rather than--say--points on the SAT's 200-800 scale or the 
ACT's 1-36 scale.  This is a because the distance between points on either 
exam does not correspond to a stable difference in percentiles.  For instance, 
100 points on the SAT between 700 and 800 is a few percentiles but 100 
points between 450 and 550 is 33 percentiles! Thus, if we used points rather 
 
onwards was scoured for data, which were generally hand-entered, 
combined, and reconciled. Guides include Marsh (1940), College Entrance 
Examination Board (1941 to 1975), Brumbaugh (1948), Irwin (1952 and 
1956), Hawes (1962 and 1966), Orchard House (1962 to 2005), College 
Entrance Examination Board (1962 and 1967), Barron's (1964 and 1968 to 
2007), Cass and Birnbaum (1964 to 1971), and Peterson's (1971 to 2000).  
College guides now mainly rely on the Common Data Set, based on College 
Board (1986 to 2007), which was also used.  In addition, annual reports of 
the American College Testing Service (Annual Report,  ACT High School 
Profile Report), the College Entrance Examination Board (Annual Report, 
College-Bound Seniors,  College-Bound Juniors and Sophomores), and the 
National Merit Scholarship Corporation (Annual Report,  The Merit 
Scholars, Certificate of Merit Winners) were scoured for data. All years of 
available administrative survey data from the Higher Education General 
Information System (1966 to 1986), the Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Data System (2008), and CASPAR (1995 and 2008) were also used.  Other 
sources are described as they arise. 
2  One converts ACT scores into SAT scores using College Entrance 
Examination Board (2008a), Dorans (1999), and Dorans and Schneider 
(1999).  One converts pre-1995 SAT scores into recentered (today's) SAT 
scores using College Entrance Examination Board (2008).    
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than percentiles, a dramatically reallocation of  students among mid-
selectivity schools that was quite important in percentile terms might be 
almost invisible in terms of mean scores.  Similarly, much smaller 
reallocations of students among high-selectivity schools in percentile terms 
would appear to be far more important if measured in points. 
  Colleges are assigned to selectivity groups such as the 1st through 5th 
percentiles, the 6th through 10th percentiles, the second decile, the third 
decile, and so on up to 96th through 98th percentiles, and the 99th 
percentile.  The ends of the distribution are broken down finely because 
they are especially interesting.  Once assigned to a group based on its 1962 
selectivity, a college stays there.  Thus, if the selectivity of a group of 
colleges is rising, it is because the (given) set of colleges is becoming more 
selective.3 
  Figure 1 shows that, in 1962, the average student enrolled in one of the 
most selective 5 percent of colleges had an entrance exam score at the 90th 
percentile.  The least selective 5 percent of four-year colleges enrolled an 
average student who scored at about the 50th percentile.  Of course, one 
might ask where the rest of college entrance exam takers went.  Some did 
not go to college at all.  Some went to "no-exam colleges" that have never 
required students to take entrance exams, even for diagnostic purposes.   
F i n a l l y ,  s o m e  w e n t  t o  t w o - y e a r  c o lleges.  Using surveys that include 
achievement and aptitude tests, I can show that two-year colleges and no-
exam four-year colleges were considerably less selective than the observably 
least selective four-year colleges.    Figure 1 shows an estimated line for 
two-year colleges, but the samples are small and these estimates are 
correspondingly imprecise.4 
  The key fact illustrated by Figure 1 is that the market for college 
 
3   The groups are not weighted by colleges' enrollment. 
4  To get estimates for the two-year college line shown in Figure 1, I took 
data from Project Talent (Flanagan et al, 2001), the National Longitudinal 
Study of the Class of 1972 (National Center for Education Statistics, 1994), 
High School and Beyond (National Center for Education Statistics, 1995), 
the National Education Longitudinal Study 1988 (National Center for 
Education Statistics, 2002), and the Education Longitudinal Study 2002/06 
(National Center for Education Statistics, 2007).  These surveys test the 
achievement of their respondents and record where they enroll in college.  
By mapping the achievement tests onto the stable SAT percentile scores, I 
obtain estimates of how two-year college students would perform on the 
SAT or ACT, were they to take those exams.  The estimates, being based on 
fairly small samples, are not precise.  
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education became more stratified or, in more colloquial terms, "fanned-out."  
In the early 1960s, the most and observably least selective four-year 
colleges were about 40 percentiles apart. The trends at the time, if 
extrapolated back, suggest that the gap was a much tighter 20 percentiles a 
decade previously.  This is consistent with the spotty 1950s data that are 
available.  By 1985, the gap had risen to 66 percentiles.  By 2007, the gap 
had risen to at least 76 percentiles, more if we consider two-year and no-
exam four-year colleges.  Only colleges above the 80th percentile are as 
selective as they were in 1962, and only colleges above the 90th percentile 
are substantially more selective than they were in 1962.  Strikingly, by 
2007, the most selective colleges were up against the ceiling of selectivity.  
Their average student was scoring at the 98th percentile. This number can 
rise to the 99th percentile, but, once it is there, further increases in these 
colleges' selectivity (choosing students carefully  from within the 99th 
percentile on grounds on other than test scores) will not be visible to us.   
  Of course, this fanning-out pattern does not capture all the changes in 
colleges during this time. For example, certain schools--such as single-sex 
colleges and Catholic colleges--lost popularity and became less selective for 
essentially exogenous social reasons.  But the overall pattern is that 
colleges that were the most selective coming out of World War II and the 
1950s became more selective in the years that followed.  Colleges that were 
initially the least selective become less selective.  Between-college 
differences in student aptitude rose, within-college differences in aptitude 
fell,  and each college became more homogeneous.  (For evidence on within- 
college differences in  student aptitude, see Hoxby, 1997 or Hoxby, 
forthcoming). 
  Although in Figure 1 and figures that follow, colleges are grouped 
according to their 1962 selectivity, the figures would look very similar if 
colleges had been grouped according to the fixed standard of their 
selectivity today.  This is because, as is now clear, initially more selective 
colleges became more selective and initially less selective colleges became 
less selective.  Thus, only a small share of colleges'  ordinal positions shifted 
much between 1962 and 2007, even though their absolute selectivity shifted 
substantially. 
  Because many people are confused by it, it is worth noting the "dip" in 
nearly all college groups' trends lines that appears from the mid 1970s 
through the early 1980s in Figure 1.  During this period, there was a real, 
pronounced negative shift in the entire distribution o f  U . S .  s t u d e n t s '  
achievement. It was followed by a roughly equivalent rightward shift so 
that the distribution is now much the same as it was in 1970.  The dip 
shows up not just in SAT and ACT scores but in all achievement data:    
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scores on the NAEP, scores on nationally popular standardized tests 
(Stanford 9, Iowa Test of Basic Skills, and so on).  The dip has been 
extensively analyzed and, while it is still not fully explained, analysts have 
been able to show that the whole distribution shifted left and back:  it was 
not merely that marginal students first selected into taking the exams and 
then selected out of taking them. 
  The point of this digression is that it is best, when interpreting Figure 
1, to ignore the dip.  This is because the dip does not represent meaningful 
changes in the behavior of colleges or students--for instance, a college that 
kept admitting students at the same contemporary aptitude percentile 
would have seen a dip in absolute scores.  Neither the college nor its 
students would have perceived this dip as a change in selectivity.  (Recall 
that Figure 1 shows exam performance in absolute terms.)  Since the 
distribution of U.S. students' achievement was fully out of the dip by 1990 
(that is, the percentiles of the distribution had fully recovered), it may be 
helpful to draw a mental line connecting 1972 to 1990 on Figure 1.  That 
mental line will show the trend without the distracting dip, and the 
selectivity trends will be clearer.5  
 
Falling College Selectivity Overall 
  So far, I have emphasized how colleges that were initially very selective 
became more selective while colleges that were initially less selective 
experienced the opposite trend.  Such a focus leads us to think about 
students' re-sorting themselves, and I will maintain this focus for the most 
of the paper.  However, it is important to realize that the stratification we 
have seen played out against a background of declining college selectivity 
overall. This overall decline was caused by the number of college places 
growing faster over time than the population of qualified students. 
  Column 1 of Table 1 shows the number of high school graduates in the 
U.S., from 1955 to today.  This number rose by 131 percent, a substantial 
increase.  However, column 2 shows that, over the same period, the number 
of freshman seats in the U.S. rose by 297 percent.  This suggests that the 
absolute standard of achievement required of a freshman who successfully 
competed for a seat was falling. 
  Of course, the standard of achievement required of a freshman could 
 
5   See National Center for Education Statistics (2005) for evidence 
on the percentiles of the math and verbal achievement distributions for a 
nationally representative sample of 17 year olds from 1971 to 2004.  The dip 
is visible, as is the fact that since the dip ended, the distribution has not 
changed much for students in the college-going achievement range.  
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have been rising, despite the growth in the number of seats, if achievement 
of high school graduates rose fast enough between 1955 and today.  We 
cannot know exactly how secondary school achievement changed between 
1955 and 1970 because there was no national testing.  However, beginning 
in 1970, the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) has 
measured the long-term trend in 12th graders' achievement on a consistent 
basis.  Students who score Proficient on the NAEP are moderately well 
prepared for college.  Students who score at the Basic level on the NAEP are 
minimally prepared for college--that is, they may have to undergo 
remediation even at a non-selective college because their mathematics and 
reading comprehension skills are limited.6 
  If we look at the number of freshman seats per moderately-prepared 
twelfth grader (column 3) or minimally-prepared twelfth grader (column 4), 
we see that the number of seats per prepared student has been rising 
steadily.  Moreover, since 1975, there has been more than one seat per 
minimally prepared student.  In short, the achievement standard for 
obtaining a freshman seat in the U.S. is minimal and is falling. 
  The number of prepared college students does not explain even the 
rising selectivity of the most selective colleges (categorized according to 
their 1962 selectivity).  In 1965, there were 0.47 freshman seats in the most 
selective colleges for each student with a verbal SAT score of 700 (pre-1995 
scale).7   In 2007, there were 0.58 freshman seats in the most selective 
colleges for each such student.   This is because, although the most selective 
colleges have not expanded greatly, they have expanded more than enough 
to keep up with the modest growth in the number of students scoring in the 
very top range. 
  In short, re-sorting accounts for more than 100 percent of the observed 
 
6  For descriptions of the NAEP long-term trend achievement levels, see the 
"Reading Performance-Level Descriptions" and "Mathematics Performance-
Level Descriptions" sections of National Center for Education Statistics 
(2005). 
7  I chose a verbal score of 700 on the pre-1995 SAT scale because it is an 
absolute level of achievement that cuts off approximately the top 5 percent 
of SAT scorers in 1960.  The math test has always been considerably less 
discriminating in the top end of the score range, so that published 
distributions of the math score cannot be used to find the top few percent.  
The re-centered (today's) SAT is also fairly non-discriminating at the top 
end of the score range.  For instance, a score of 700 on the pre-1995 verbal 
SAT corresponds to a score of 760 on the recentered SAT.  See College 
Entrance Examination Board (2008b).  
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increase in selectivity at the most selective colleges.  These colleges' 
selectivity would fallen slightly had re-sorting not taken place.  In contrast, 
the decreasing selectivity of most colleges was caused both by re-sorting 
(which did not operate in their favor) and the number of seats growing 
faster than the number of qualified students. 
  The main purpose of this section was to demonstrate the importance of 
re-sorting as the explanation for rising selectivity in initially selective 
colleges.  The competing explanation--the number of places rising too 
slowly--turns out to be a non-starter. Also, the reader will also see that 
policy makers should take care not to enact policies based on the experience 
of a subset of colleges without considering their ramifications for colleges 
which have a very different experience.  For instance, expanding the 
number of seats available in very selective colleges might reverse their 
rising selectivity but would likely steepen the decline in other colleges' 
selectivity.  
 
The Causes of Changing College Selectivity 
  What could have caused students to make such different college choices  
that we see the fanning-out of selectivity that we observe?  What could have 
caused initially selective colleges to become more selective in an 
environment where most colleges' selectivity was falling? 
  One important explanation for resorting is the increased willingness of 
students to attend college far from the homes of their parents.  Anything 
that decreases the disutility generated by distance may cause students to 
match themselves to colleges on other bases, such as the resources or peers 
a college offers. Thanks to a combination of technological advances and 
increased competition,  the cost of communicating and traveling over a long 
distance fell tremendously during this time. The cost of a 10-minute cross-
county telephone call in 2007 dollars (converted from Federal 
Communications Commission data using the Personal Consumption 
Expenditures price index with food and energy excluded) fell from $48.32 in 
1960 to $25.91 in 1970, $9.96 in 1980, $3.97 in 1990, and $2.61 by 2005. 
Similarly, the costs of long-distance travel as measured by airline revenue 
per 100 passenger air miles in 2007 dollars (converted from Federal 
Aviation Authority data as before) fell from $42.65 in 1960 to $32.06 in 
1970, $28.91 in 1980, $20.75 in 1990, and $13.05 by 2005.  
  However, a far more dramatic fall in costs occurred in the cost of 
information:  colleges' information about students and, to a lesser extent, 
students' information about colleges.  In 1955, there was no early national 
college aptitude test. Students and colleges simply did not know where 
students stood in the national distribution of high school graduates'  
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achievement or aptitude.  Colleges were highly dependent on feeder high 
schools whose standards they understood.  Although 23 percent of students 
took the SAT in 1955, nearly all of these students took the exam between 
April and June of their senior year, too late to change their college-going 
plans. 
  In 1956, the National Merit Scholarship Qualifying Test (NMSQT), 
later renamed the Preliminary SAT or PSAT, was introduced and 
administered to 10th graders.  This test and its associated scholarships not 
only generated dramatic integration in the distribution of U.S. merit aid, 
the test also provided information to students and colleges about each 
student's achievement, relative to the nation.  Amazingly, the test went 
from informing 0 percent of future freshmen in 1955 to 60 percent in 1956!  
The introduction of the NMSQT also fueled a massive increase in SAT-
taking, so that the number of SAT takers per freshmen seat went from 23 
percent to 94 percent in 10 years.  See Table 2.  (The 94 percent number is a 
bit hard to interpret because taking the exam once as a junior and once as a 
senior became popular during this period.  For several years, the College 
Board double-counted such students, but then it stopped doing so.  This is 
why the series looks non-monotonic when the, in fact, it probably rose 
monotonically.)  In any case, all the indicators suggest that students were 
extremely hungry for information about their achievement. 
  On the colleges' side, there was an equal recognition that the cost of 
identifying qualified students had plunged.  Table 2 shows that the number 
of colleges that required the SAT or ACT was a mere 143 in 1955.  By 1965, 
the number had more than quintupled.  The number doubled again between 
1965 and 1980, and by 1990 it was 1839 colleges.8  T h i s  n u m b e r  
 
8 Table 2 shows indicators of colleges' demanding aptitude 
information on distant students and students' demanding the ability to 
broadcast their aptitude to distant colleges.  Requiring the SAT or ACT is a 
sign that a college draws its students from a large number of high schools, 
most of which are so unfamiliar that a standardized test score is a better 
indicator of achievement than a high school transcript.  Similarly, taking 
the SAT is an indication that a student wants to attend one or more colleges 
that do not have deep familiarity with his high school.  That is, it is an 
expression of interest in distant colleges. 
A high school transcript contains much more information than a 
standardized test score.  Unfortunately, the information is relative to a 
standard that a college will not understand unless it draws very often from 
the high school.  Thus, a college with a very local draw can be selective 
without requiring the SAT or ACT because it can use high school  
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understates the true demand for entrance exams since even colleges that do 
not officially require the SAT or ACT may in fact be reluctant to admit 
students who do not provide one of them.  Today, the number of colleges 
that obtain SAT or ACT scores from the majority of their applicants is about 
20 percent larger than the number who require the tests (Annual Survey of 
Colleges, 2007).  A school might prefer not to require the tests in order to 
defuse the anger of critics who believe there are racial or ethnic biases in 
the tests. 
  Although it is somewhat harder to quantify the decrease in students' 
costs of obtaining information about colleges, these costs also fell rapidly 
from the 1950s through today.  Because my research is highly dependent on 
gathering information from college guides, no one could be more aware than 
I am of how much easier it was to become informed about colleges in the 
1960s (when guides began routinely to include "hard" information on 
students' test scores and grades) versus the 1950s; how much easier it was 
again in the 1970s (when each guide sought to have nearly universal 
coverage) versus the 1960s; how much easier it was again in the 1980s 
(when the guides began to gather information in a uniform way) versus the 
1970s; and so on.  Today, the web contains an incredible volume of 
information about colleges, and the sites are set up so that students can 
easily find and compare the colleges that match their criteria. 
  In addition, the reporting required for financial aid became much more 
standardized starting in 1954, when the College Scholarship Service was 
founded.  Standardization of financial reporting continued through the 
1970s, when the modern financial aid form was introduced.  Such 
standardization makes it significantly easier for students to apply to 
multiple colleges and compare them. 
  It is fairly intuitive that the falling costs of distance and information 
were the causes of integration, but can one show this?   A demonstration 
has to be based on timing and which colleges and areas of the country re-
sorted students earlier.  For instance, the colleges that adopted 
standardized entrance exams earlier saw earlier increases in the 
homogeneity of their students' aptitude and earlier dispersion in the 
geography of their students' homes. Similarly, when a state switched policy 
 
information well.  Indeed, this is what every selective college did prior to 
the integration of the market for college education.  In short, Table 2 should 
not be read as showing the number of colleges in the U.S. that are selective. 
Similarly, Table 2 should not be read as showing the number of 
students in the U.S. interested in college.  Many students attend local 
colleges without taking the SAT or ACT.  
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so that standardized testing was required of most of its college-going 
students, it typically saw a jump in the percentage of students who 
attended college outside the state and the region.  See Hoxby, 2005. 
 
A Note on Measures of College Selectivity 
  The astute reader will now be able to see why I use test scores, rather 
than admissions rates, as a measure of colleges' selectivity.  Since 
admissions rates are data that are much easier to obtain than test scores 
(see footnote 1), the choice is not one that I made lightly.  
  A college's admissions rate is, obviously, a function of the number of 
students who apply to it.  In an environment where students' college choices 
are changing--as they have been shown to be changing--the meaning of an 
application is shifting and the admissions rate is therefore unreliable as a 
measure of selectivity.  To give a simple example, suppose that, in the 
1950s, each college-going student applied only to a single local college 
because his choice was constrained greatly by proximity.  Suppose that, in 
recent years, each student applied to a "portfolio" of four colleges whose 
characteristics spanned those he wanted to consider.   In this case, each 
college's admissions rate would have fallen four-fold even though some 
colleges' selectivity would have actually been rising and other colleges' 
selectivity would have actually been falling!  This example differs from the 
truth only in so far as round numbers were used for simplicity. In 1967, The 
American Freshman survey reported that 43 percent of college freshman 
had applied to only one college and only 20 percent had applied to four or 
more (Pryor et al, 2007).  In 2006, the same survey reported that only 18 
percent of freshman had applied to only one college and 57 percent had 
applied to four or more. (The survey understates the share of students who 
apply to only one college because it samples no non-selective colleges and 
very few less selective ones.) 
  Admissions rates can also fall when selectivity is not rising because 
students apply to colleges for which they are not qualified and would never 
have been qualified.  Suppose that every illiterate person in the U.S. 
applied to every college and that they were all summarily rejected.  Would 
we say that selectivity had increased?  Surely not.  Rising selectivity means, 
by definition, that the threshold (on the basis of aptitude or some other 
attribute) has risen.  Merely adding unqualified people to the pool does not 
change the threshold.  To make the scenario less stark and more realistic, 
suppose that school counselors now encourage all students to apply to 
college, regardless of whether they have prepared themselves or whether 
they have a real interest in enrolling.  (Counselors might feel that it was 
now socially "correct" to say that everyone should attend college even if it  
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would actually be a bad investment for some.  Since college is costly, both in 
terms of direct and opportunity costs, and since poorly prepared students 
usually drop out after having paid some of these costs, college is predictably 
a bad investment for some students.)  If counselors induce many students to 
apply who then realize that they do not want to attend (or--more precisely-
attend the colleges that will admit them since non-selective colleges will 
admit anyone with a high school degree or a GED), the admissions rate will 
fall even though no college has raised its selectivity. 
  In short, it is a logical fallacy that the admissions rate has a necessary 
equivalence with or even a monotonic relationship with selectivity.  It has 
neither and should therefore not be used as an indicator of selectivity.  
 
 
Modeling the Market for College Education 
At this point, we have discussed the causes of college market integration 
and seen that a great deal of re-sorting of students took place.  But, why 
need integration lead to a more stratified sorting, as opposed to some other 
form of sorting?  Theory is useful not only for answering this question but 
for understanding implications of integration that go beyond student 
sorting. 
  The market for college education is usually modeled as  a two-sided 
matching problem in which the efficient outcome allocates students to 
colleges based on students' ability to benefit from the type and magnitude of 
the human capital investment that the college offers.  (If we pose the 
problem as one for the social planner, the planner maximizes the total 
output of society minus the total cost of the inputs invested in students.) 
Reducing the cost of distance increases the number of students and colleges 
in the match, and is--thereby--likely to increase the efficiency of each match. 
Reducing the cost of the information that each side has about the other has 
an even greater effect on match efficiency.  This is because information 
directly increases the likelihood that potential matches are that actually 
efficient are known to both the student and college in question. 
  Allowing, then, that college market integration is likely to make 
matching more efficient, when would we expect more efficient matches to 
exhibit the re-sorting we actually see?  It turns out that we need to have 
some form of complementarity between a student's own ability and a 
college's characteristics. 
  In Rothschild and White's (1993, 1995) seminal model, students vary on 
an ascending scale of aptitude and colleges vary in curricular type.  A 
college with a higher curricular type employs increasingly expensive 
teaching methods that are disproportionately useful to high aptitude  
 
13
students.  This disproportionately usefulness is the key complementarity 
assumption:  more able students can invest in a more expensive type of 
college education (faculty, libraries, laboratories, etc.) before their marginal 
return to human capital falls to equal their discount rate. The model 
generates a student-college matching that is stratified--that is, vertically 
differentiated both on student aptitude and on college inputs. 
  Alternatively. a vertically differentiated matching can be generated by a 
complementarity in peer effects  (more able students benefit more from 
interacting with high ability peers) or any of several other plausible sources 
of complementarity (Epple, Romano, and Seig, 2006; Courant, Resch, and 
Sallee, 2008). The key takeaway is that some such complementarity is 
produce a stable, stratified outcome.  The complementarity guarantees that 
(in the absence of credit constraints) the lowest aptitude student admitted 
to a college would, if forced to bid against other students to keep his seat, 
outbid even the highest aptitude student who was denied admission. 
  The aforementioned models assume that there is a single dimension of 
aptitude on which students differ.  But, of course, there may be multiple 
forms of aptitude: some students may have high aptitude in math, others 
may have high aptitude in language arts, and so on.  To the extent that 
students have a similar overall level of aptitude but differ in the form it 
takes, the aforementioned models generate horizontally differentiated 
matching.  (Horizontal differentiation means that colleges specialize in 
subjects.  Vertical differentiation means that colleges specialize in 
educating students of a specific level of aptitude, a concept that only makes 
sense if there is such a thing as general aptitude.)  In horizontally 
differentiated matching, colleges that specialize in science admit students 
based on their science aptitude, colleges that specialize in the humanities 
admit students based on their aptitude in the arts, and so on.  Although 
integration of the college market has increased horizontal differentiation 
somewhat, the most obvious effect of integration has been vertical 
differentiation of undergraduate education. 
  A Rothschild-White type of model implies that high aptitude students 
are clustered together in colleges that offer high inputs and that charge 
correspondingly high tuition.  In fact, the key result of their second paper is 
that a frictionless (costless distance and costless information), decentralized 
market in which colleges maximize profits would produce the same student-
college matching as  a social planner who was maximizing the net output of 
the economy. This efficiency result obtains because, in their model, students 
are paying for their own education; they have no reason to under- or  
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overinvest; and prices ration colleges effectively.9  (In the Rothschild-White 
model, colleges, though profit-maximizing, always earn zero profits.) 
  The aforementioned models do not explain certain features of the 
market for college education:  institutional tuition subsidies (the positive 
difference between the cost of the inputs a student receives and the tuition 
he pays), the role of endowments, and the fact that colleges need to ration 
their places through admission (not just price). 
  To explain these features, Hoxby (forthcoming) extends a Rothchild and 
White-type model and makes it intergenerational.  In her model, each 
college has a "dynasty"--the dynasty being all of the alumni of the college. In 
the intergenerational model, each generation of students pays less than the 
full cost of their education at the time they attend college. This is the 
institutional subsidy. Although students in each generation graduate 
having r ec eived m or e in puts that t h ey p aid for, they lat er d onat e t o th e 
college and fund part of the education of later generations of the dynasty--
just as previous generations did for them. This use of endowments is, in 
fact, characteristic of American colleges.  Colleges need to admit students 
on aptitude--they cannot depend on price as a rationing mechanism--since 
the tuition that a student pays when enrolled is not great enough to justify 
the investment that the college makes in him.  The college needs later gifts 
to "close the books" on a cohort, and the later gifts depend on aptitude. 
  Interestingly, an intergenerational model with endowments can also 
explain why market integration fuels a right skewness of the human capital 
investments offered by colleges.  In the next section, I trace this and other 
implications of integration for colleges' resources, tuition subsidies, and 
tuition. 
  Before moving ahead, it is worth noting that it is harder to claim an 
efficiency result in an intergenerational model with endowments than in 
the static Rothschild-White model where student tuition covers the cost of 
inputs.  This is because we have a solid understanding of how much tuition 
students should be willing to pay (we can invoke a standard model of 
human capital investment) but only a limited understanding of how many 
dollars alumni should be willing to donate.  For now, let us set this 
efficiency question aside, noting that the intergenerational model predicts 
the main financial consequences that we actually observe.  We will return to 
the question of efficiency at the end of the paper. 
 
 
9  Of course, there are other reasons why college investments might be 
inefficient:  failures in the market for financing college education, spillovers 
from the college education of some people onto others, and so on.  
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Consequences of the Changing Selectivity of American 
Colleges: the Resources Students Experience 
The resorting of students among colleges clearly caused high aptitude 
students to experience peers who were themselves increasingly of high 
aptitude.  The reverse is true of students with low college aptitude.  In 
addition, the resorting of students among colleges substantially increased 
the correlation between a student's aptitude and the resources invested in 
his college education, regardless of whether those resources are measured 
by instructional resources, faculty qualifications, college facilities, or other 
indicators. 
  Figure 2 shows colleges' real student-oriented resources per student 
over time.  Colleges are grouped exactly as they were in Figure 1, from most 
to least selective in 1962.  Student-oriented resources include spending on 
instruction, student services, academic support, and operation and 
maintenance of facilities.  Student-oriented resources do not include 
spending on research, public services, hospitals, or other functions.10 
  Student-oriented resources were initially more similar among low and 
high selectivity colleges than they are today.  In 1967, the lowest selectivity 
schools spent about $3900 per student and the highest selectivity schools 
spent about $17,400 per student.  Resources per student thereafter fanned 
out, with the low selectivity schools' resources eventually reaching about 
$12,000 per student and the highest selectivity schools' resources reaching 
about $92,000.  (Note that 2-year and no-exam four year colleges have much 
lower resources per student than the observably least selective four-year 
colleges.)  Much of the fanning-out occurs because resources per student 
develop a notable right skew--that is, they rise faster at institutions that 
were initially most selective.  Some of the apparent skew is due to the fact 
the same percentage growth rate will generate more absolute growth if a 
college starts with a higher base.  However, the average annual growth rate 
of real resources per student was about 7 percent at the least selective 
colleges and about 13 percent at the most selective colleges.  At the colleges 
in between, the growth rate rises monotonically from 7 to 13. 
  In Figure 2, I show resources measured in dollars, but I could have 
shown figures that displayed very similar patterns for many sub-indices of 
 
10  Some fraction of research and public service expenditures do benefit 
students, but--on the other hand--some f r a c t i o n  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a n d  
facilities expenditures do not benefit students.  There is no perfect way to 
divide expenditures.  However, instructional expenditures greatly dominate 
student-oriented expenditures, and the figure would look similar if only 
they were included.  
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resources, measured in non-monetary metrics:  faculty-student ratios, the 
percentage of faculty with Ph.D.s, volumes in the library, square feet of 
student-oriented buildings (not including hospitals and other such 
buildings), and indices of the average faculty member's capacity (authorship 
of highly used textbooks, highly cited research, awards, and so on).  All such 
resource indices fan out and develop a right skew. 
  Students' re-sorting themselves led to substantial increases in the 
aptitude-resource correlation for two reasons.  First, because, at the 
beginning of the period of rapid integration,  more selective colleges had 
greater resources per student, resorting led mechanically to an increased  
aptitude-resource correlation.  Second, colleges' resources changed 
endogenously with their student bodies. 
  The mechanical effect (resorting of students, holding colleges' resources 
fixed) accounts for only about a quarter of the increase in the correlation 
between a student's measured aptitude  and the resources devoted to his 
college education. The correlation between average aptitude (the absolute 
value of math and verbal SAT scores) and resources per student rose from 
0.14 in 1967 to 0.57 in 2007.  About a quarter of this change in correlation is 
due purely to resorting. 
  Thus, the endogenous effect (colleges' resources depend on their student 
bodies) accounts for three-quarters of the increase in the aptitude-resource 
correlation. Theory predicts that dependence occurs for several reasons.   
First, if higher aptitude students can earn the market rate of return on a 
larger human capital investment, then colleges that were initially selective 
will have found that their students, as they increased in aptitude, will have 
demanded (and been willing to pay for) better qualified faculty, better 
facilities, and otherwise improved quality of instruction.  Second, when 
higher aptitude students make human capital investments, their returns 
are greater in absolute terms.  Thus, if they donate some share of their 
returns to their colleges, their donations as alumni will be larger and will 
buy more resources for the next generation of students. Thus, higher 
aptitude students will benefit from greater gifts and will thus be able to 
finance larger investments in their human capital than they could probably 
finance on their own (with family money, loans, and so on). Third (and this 
is outside the models discussed above), external donors' dollars may flow 
toward institutions that enroll high aptitude students, most likely because 
donors think that their money will be more productive if directed toward an 
institution where an agglomeration of high quality faculty are working with 
smart students and state-of-the art resources. 
  The main take-away from the evidence in this section is that market 
integration and the consequent re-matching of students to colleges has  
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generated tremendous differentiation in the size of the human capital 
investments that students make.  While all four-year colleges offer greater 
human capital investments today than they did four decades ago, the 
magnitude of the investments for high aptitude students is striking.  (Of 
course there is not a one-to-one equivalence between expenditures and 
human capital investments, but the vast increase in expenditures is due 
primarily to increases in instructional spending, not to spending on 
amenities such as recreational sports facilities.)  Figure 2 shows us why so 
many people pay attention to the small number of colleges whose selectivity 
has risen over time:  the "stakes" associated with being a very high aptitude 
student have risen tremendously. 
  A few caveats are in order. 
  Because investment differentials are increasingly correlated with 
students' aptitude, they are less correlated with other characteristics of 
students, such as their parental background.  This can be shown explicitly 
but should be fairly evident because it is an almost automatic side-effect, 
given the imperfect correlation between aptitude and parental background.  
For instance, Hoxby and Long (1999) show falling correlation between 1960 
and today between college investments and parents' income, parents' 
education, race, and Hispanic ethnicity.  
  When people speak of colleges' having rapidly rising per-student 
spending, they may be extrapolating from the most selective schools, whose 
annual rate of  growth in resources was twice that of the least selective 
schools. One might still ask, however, why is per-student spending in less 
selective colleges' rising at all--albeit more modestly--when such colleges are 
no more selective today and often less selective than in the past?  Here, 
there are a number of possible answers, but one part of the explanation may 
be the rise in the return to college education that appears to have stated in 
the 1980s.  If the return is rising, the same aptitude student will want to 
invest more now than in the past.  Another explanation is Baumol's (1967):  
college education is a non-traded service so that its cost rises with labor 
productivity in traded sectors, with which it must compete for workers.   
Baumol's argument has special force in higher education, which depends 
heavily on high aptitude, highly educated workers whose returns in traded 
sectors have grown especially rapidly over recent decades. 
 
Further Consequences of Changing Selectivity:  the Amount 
Students Pay and Do Not Pay for College 
  In the U.S. system of higher education, students (and their families) pay 
for only a share of their college education through tuition.  The remaining 
payments are made by students later in life when, as alumni who earn  
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returns on their human capital, they donate to private colleges and pay 
taxes that support public colleges.  While the accounting is obviously not 
strict--a person can attend one college and later donate to or pay taxes that 
support another college--the entire system would collapse if, in the 
aggregate, people did not later repay the subsidies they received at the time 
they were enrolled.  Subsidies are defined as the difference between the 
resources that a student experiences when enrolled (shown in the last 
section) and the tuition he pays. 
  Figure 3 shows the annual subsidy per student, in real terms, for 
colleges from 1967 to 2007.  Colleges are again grouped by their selectivity 
in 1962. 
  What strikes the eye in Figure 3 is the tremendous increase in real 
subsidies per student for colleges that were in the top three selectivity 
groups in 1962.  In 1967, colleges with selectivity in the 91st through 95th 
percentiles had about the same real subsidies per student as the least 
selective colleges.  By 2007, these very selective colleges had subsidies of 
$14,118, twice as large as those in the least selective colleges.  In 1967, 
colleges with selectivity in the 96th through 98th percentiles had real 
subsidies per student of $2509, only modestly higher than the subsidies in 
the least selective colleges.  By 2007, these extremely selective colleges had 
subsidies that were four times as large as those of the least selective 
colleges.   Finally, the most selective colleges began with real subsidies that 
were about four times those of the least selective colleges and ended with 
subsidies about 10 times those of the least selective colleges.  It is 
interesting to note that the annual real growth rate in subsidies averaged 
about 25 percent for all of the top three selectivity groups.  They just started 
from different bases.  Other selectivity groups had annual real growth rates 
in subsidies that averaged between 7 and 10 percent. 
  Even without seeing the calculations, the reader may be able to discern 
that tuition revenue has been falling as a share of student-oriented 
resources for the most selective colleges.  Figure 4 makes this statement 
precise.  The same groups of colleges are shown in the figure, but some 
groups are left out so that patterns are discernable.  (Otherwise, the fairly 
similar patterns of colleges in the middling selectivity groups would obscure 
everything else.) 
  Average tuition paid as a share of student-oriented resources falls for 
every selectivity group, but the patterns differ.  The least selective colleges 
start out with average tuition paid being about 60 percent of resources, and 
this statistic vacillates, ending up at about 44 percent.  Most of these 
colleges are public colleges whose students have modest incomes.  Thus, 
tuition paid is not a large share of resources because tax dollars make up  
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the difference.  Colleges at 51st through 60th percentile of selectivity have 
tuition paid fall from 88 percent of resources to about 65 percent of 
resources.  This is a substantial decrease but students at such colleges (and 
other middling selectivity colleges) continue to finance most of their own 
investments in human capital through the tuition they pay. 
  In contrast, students at the most selective colleges paid tuition equal to 
only 46 percent of their human capital investment even in 1967.  By 2007, 
they were financing only 21 percent of their investment through tuition!  
The remaining colleges in the top decile of selectivity have students who 
finance more of their human capital investment (45 to 55 percent in 2007) 
but who also experienced a massive decrease in tuition paid as a share of 
resources, which was 75 to 100 percent in 1967. 
  The bottom line is that society is helping nearly all students make 
larger human capital investments by allowing them to pay for less up front 
and more in the future through donations or taxes. Nevertheless, most 
students still finance most of their human capital investment through 
tuition.  It is only very high aptitude students who pay tuition that covers 
only a small share of the resources devoted to their education.  The small 
share paid by these high aptitude students is particularly striking since the 
vast majority attend private colleges that have no ability to enforce 
repayment, through donations, of the massive subsidies they offer. 
  Are any students getting a windfall?  On average and in equilibrium, 
the answer is probably no.  The very high aptitude students experience 
massive subsidies but, on average, they pay them back. However, if a 
student whose true aptitude would not earn him admission to a very 
selective college can succeed in gaining admission by manipulating the 
information on his application, that student will get a windfall.  It is no 
wonder, then, that students attempt various forms of manipulation.  It is 
also no wonder that very selective colleges ration their seats on aptitude  
(not price) and try to ensure that students report accurate aptitude 
information on their applications.   
  Although very high aptitude students are not getting a windfall on 
average, they are much better off than they were under autarky.  In 
autarky, they were the captives of their local college and routinely under-
invested in human capital.  With integration, they experience massive 
investments in their human capital, and it is colleges, not they or their 
families, that face most of the risk and difficulty associated with financing 
such vast investments.  If high aptitude students do not actually earn much 
after attending a very selective college, they just do not donate much.  It is 
up to the college to ensure that the books eventually balance for every 
cohort of students.  Put another way, for high aptitude students,  
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globalization represents a great release from market power.  As they have 
become increasingly footloose, they have gained systemically. 
 
  A note on tuition growth, the subject of much policy debate, is in order.  
Studying time trends in tuition really only makes sense if (a) tuition 
generally pays for the resources students receive in college and (b) those 
resources have remained relatively constant over time.  Neither of these 
conditions hold.  We have seen that the average student pays tuition that 
covers only some of the resources he receives.  Moreover, the resources he 
experiences have grown at a faster rate, in some cases a much faster rate, 
than tuition. 
  For instance, over the 1967 to 2007 period, the average annual growth 
rate of tuition paid was 5 percent at the least selective colleges, but the 
growth rate in their resources was 8 percent and the growth rate in their 
subsidies was 10 percent.  Over the 1967 to 2007 period, the average annual 
growth rate of tuition paid was 6 percent at the most selective colleges, but 
the growth rate in their resources was 13 percent  and the growth rate in 
their subsidies was 25 percent!  
  
On the Return to Attending a More Selective College 
  All along, the discussion has assumed that students earn more if they 
invest in more human capital (for which they expect to have to pay, in one 
form or another).  Is this the case?  Do students actually earn a reasonable 
rate of return when they invest in a college with richer resources?  This 
question is the subject of an empirical literature on the return to attending 
a more selective college. 
  The most credible studies are based on regression discontinuity or 
quasi-experimental designs.  See, for instance Hoekstra (forthcoming) and 
Saavedra (2008).  To illustrate these designs, consider Hoekstra's study of a 
state's flagship university that has a sharp admissions cut-off based on 
admissions exam scores. Because they are admitted if they apply, students 
who are just above the cut-off are much more likely to attend the flagship 
university than students who just below the cut-off.  The latter group of 
students are not admitted (just!) and therefore attend less selective 
universities.  Hoekstra uses administrative records to follow the earnings of 
people just above and just below the sharp cut-off.  He finds an earnings 
difference that is so high that, even if we assume that the flagship students 
will have to pay back 100 percent of the larger subsidy they enjoy in college, 
their rate of return is a bit higher than the long-term return on equities.  Of 
course, such regression discontinuity designs, though highly credible, have 
limitations:  they produce estimated returns local to the set of people near  
 
21
the admissions cut-off and they cannot be applied to colleges that do not use 
sharp cut-offs but instead use holistic assessment for admissions.  (Holistic 
assessment is the consideration of many student characteristics, including 
ones that can only be measured very subjectively, in a fashion that cannot 
be readily summarized by a formula. All of the most selective colleges in the 
U.S. use holistic assessment.) 
  Numerous moderately well-identified studies use straightforward 
regressions of earnings on college selectivity with a wide array of controls 
for students' high school preparation, aptitude, and parental background.  
See, for instance, Brewer et al (1996) or Monks (2000).  Black and Smith 
(2006) stands out as the most sophisticated analysis in this vein.  All of 
these studies tend to find rates of return that are around the long-term 
return on equities, even if we assume that students pay back 100 percent of 
the subsidy they receive.  (Few of these studies directly account for what 
students pay in tuition and for the subsidies they receive.  Thus, the reader 
must typically compute the rate of return for himself.)  However, economists 
worry that such analyses may overestimate the return to attending a more 
selective college if they control insufficiently for characteristics, like 
motivation, that are hard to observe. 
  Finally, Dale and Krueger (2002) compute lower rates of return but 
their estimates are based on an identification strategy that is much less 
credible.  They compare students who gained admission to approximately 
the same menu of colleges.  They compare the earnings of those who, from 
within the same menu, chose a much more selective college and a much less 
selective college. However, since at least 90 percent of students who have 
the same menu similarly choose the more selective college(s) within it, the 
strategy generates estimates that rely entirely on the small share of 
students who make what is a very odd choice.  These are students who 
know that they could choose a much more selective college and who have 
already expressed interest in a much more selective college (they applied).  
Yet, they choose differently than 9 out of 10 students. Almost certainly, 
these odd students are characterized by omitted variables that affect both 
their college decision and their later life outcomes. 
  The long and the short of it is that studies with moderate to strongly 
credible identification strategies suggest that the returns are such that the 
typical student is sensible when he applies to selective colleges and when he 
enrolls in one of the more selective colleges among those that offer him 
admission. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
  Over the past few decades, the average college has not become more  
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selective: the reverse is true, though not dramatically.  The reason that 
initially selective colleges are much more selective today is not that they 
have failed to expand to absorb greater numbers of extremely high aptitude 
students.  In fact, they have expanded modestly, keeping up with the 
modest growth in the population of such students.  
  To understand changing selectivity, we must focus how the market for 
college education has re-sorted students among schools as the costs of 
distance and information have fallen.  The reason that initially selective 
colleges are much more selective today is that, in the past, students' choices 
were very sensitive to the distance of a college from their home but, today, 
students, especially high aptitude students, are far more sensitive to a 
college's resources and student body. 
  Because colleges' resources have responded endogenously to their 
changing student populations, the stakes associated with choosing a college 
are greater today than they were four decades ago.  For very high aptitude 
students, the stakes are much greater.  The very large per-student 
resources and per-student subsidies at very selective colleges enable such 
students to make massive human capital investments if they are admitted.  
Of course, these students do, on average, pay back the subsidies so that the 
next generation has the same or better opportunities.  Nevertheless, a 
person who earns a solid rate of return on a massive investment is a person 
who is quite affluent. 
  Has the integration of the college market made students' human capital 
investments more efficient?  In a static world in which each student paid in 
tuition for the inputs he received in college, the answer would almost 
certainly be yes.  Integration would have increased efficiency by reducing 
the share of highly able students who made only modest investments in 
higher education simply because that is what their local college offered. 
  Of course, students' investments might be privately inefficient if they 
routinely miscalculate their own expected rates of returns, if there are 
failures in the capital market for financing higher education, or if they 
suffer from behavioral anomalies (like hyperbolic time preferences).  Their 
investments might also be socially inefficient if one person's college 
education generates externalities for others.  In other words, we can trot out 
all the usual reasons for private and social inefficiencies in education 
investments, but it would be such reasons--not integration of the college 
market--that would be responsible for the inefficiencies. 
  In an intergenerational world with college endowments, we can make 
parallel statements about efficiency if alumni and other donors give money 
to colleges based on assessments of the rates of return that the students  
will earn who are beneficiencies of their donations.  For instance, in the  
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interests of efficiency, we would like to see an alumnus stop giving money to 
his college if he realized that it was so overendowed that its students were 
earning low rates of return on the investment made in them. Similarly, in 
the interests of efficiency, we would like to see outside donors move their 
gifts toward the colleges that were generating the highest private and/or 
social returns on investment. To the extent that alumni and other donors 
make gifts without assessing returns, we can generate scenarios in which 
some students receive inefficiently large investments in their college 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
1955 1346e 670 . .
1960 1858 923 . .
1965 2658 1442 . .
1970 2889 2063 1.83 0.90
1975 3133 2515 2.06 1.01
1980 3043 2588 2.23 1.05
1985 2677 2292 2.14 1.03
1990 2589 2257 2.13 1.03
1995 2520 2169 2.10 1.06
2000 2833 2428 2.14 1.05




Notes:  The "baby boom" and "baby bust", not high school graduate rates, account for the dip 
and subsequent recovery in the number of high school graduates.  The apparently anomolous 
numbers for 1980  in columns (3) and (4) are due to the dip in all U.S. students' achievement 
that occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  See the text for more on this dip and why it is 
best to ignore it if one is interested in selectivity.   Moderately and minimally college-prepared 
twelfth graders score at or above, respectively, the Proficient and Basic levels on the National 
Assessment of Education Progress.  See National Center for Education Statistics (2005).   
 
Sources:  National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, various 
































Notes:  Table 2 shows indicators of colleges' demanding aptitude information on distant 
students and students' demanding the ability to broadcast their aptitude to distant colleges.   
Table 2 should not be read as showing the number of colleges in the U.S. that are selective or 
the number of students in the U.S. interested in college.  See footnote 8 for an explanation of 
this point.  
  The data in column (2) are somewhat problematic in 1960, 1965, and 1970, where 
apparent trends occur that are not actually meaningful.  The problem is that students can take 
the SAT multiple times.   Until 1975, the College Board double counted students who took the 
multiple times.  Thus, SAT test-takers per freshman seat exaggerates the share of college-going 
students who took the SAT (since the numerator double counts students who took the SAT 
twice).  The exaggeration is very small in 1955 and 1960, when very few students took the test 
before their senior year. The exaggeration was highest in 1965 and affects the 1970 number to a 
smaller degree.  From 1975 onwards, the College Board eliminated double-counting by counting 
onlyunique students who took the SAT in their senior year.  
 
Sources:  National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, various 
years; College Entrance Examination Board annual reports, various years. 